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INTRODUCTION
The twin banking and sovereign debt crises in the Euro
area have evidenced the inadequacy of the principle of
decentralized banking supervision in a monetary union. Though
this weakness was recognized long ago, indeed from the very
beginning of the euro project, it has been magnified in the
context of the global financial crisis. This paper examines the
genesis of the banking union proposals and considers the
relationship between such union, as outlined in the proposed
* Professor of International Financial and Monetary Law, CentIre for Commercial
Law Studies, Queen Mary University of London, 67-69 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London
WC2A 3JB, r.1astra~rqmul.ac.uk. In response to the call for evidence by the House of
Lords' European Union ConittCe-EU Econonic and Financial Affairs Sub-
Committee (Sub-Committee A), chaired by Lord Harrison-with regard to its inquiry
into the reform of the EU Banking Sector, I was asked to submit written evidence and
to give oral evidence. This artidce draws on the ideas that I presented in my evidence.
The report of the House of Lords is available at
http://www.publications.parlianent.uk/pa/1d201213/ldselect/Ideucom/88/88.pdf. I
thank Tatjana Nikitina for valuable research assistance and Antonio Sainz de Vicufna,
Jean Victor Louis, Charles Goodhart, Chiara Zilioli, Rene Smits and Charles Randell
for helpiul comments. Errors or limitations of judgment are mine alone.
1190
20131 BANKING UNION AND SINGLE MARKET 1191
EU Regulations,' and the existing single market in financial
services. The co-existence of those two concepts-with different
jurisdictional domains-is another manifestation of the co-
existence of two notions of the European Union: one trade and
commercially oriented, espoused by many in the United
Kingdom, and one politically oriented, in which economic
sacrifices are acceptable on the altar of further integration, as
advocated by many in Germany. Indeed, this difficult co-
existence is living proof that federalist or quasi federalist
constitutional or quasi constitutional projects are not static, but
dynamic. In their evolution they either break up completely or
they tend to gravitate towards the center.2
The paper is divided into four parts. Part I dissects the
meaning of the term "banking union." Part 11 surveys the route
towards the banking union according to the EU legislative
proposals. These proposals, namely the draft Single Supervisory
1. There are two proposed regulations, which are discussed in this article. The
first one is the so-called SSM (Single Supervisory Mechanism) Regulation and the
second one is the so-called EBA (European Banking Authority) Regulation. The
proposed SSM Regulation was first published in September 2012 (see European
Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation Conferring Specific Tasks on the
European Central Bank Concerning Policies Relating to the Prudential Supervision of
Credit Institutions, COM (2012) 511 Final, at 2, available athttp://cur-
lex.curopa.cu/LexUriSciv/LexUriSciv.do?uri=(ELEX:52012P(0511:EN:NOT ); was
then revised in December 2012 (see Proposal for a Council Regulation Conferring
Specific Tasks on the European Central Bank Concerning Policies Relating to the
Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions-C onsolidated tcxt of Deceibcr 14, 2012,
available at http://register.consiliurn.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/stl7/stl7812.enl2.pdi);
and the final text of the proposed SSM Regulation was published in July 2013 and is
available at http://register.consiliume.u ropa.cu/pdf/en/13/st09/
st09044.en 13.pdf.The proposed EA Amending Regulation was also first published in
September 2012 (see European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council Amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010,
COM (2012) 512 Final, at 2, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriSci.do?uri=(ELEX:52012P(0512:EN:NOT); then amended in December 2012
(see Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
Amending Regulation (EC) No 1093/2010 Establishing a European Supervisory
Authority (European Banking Authority), revised proposal of December 14, 2012
available at http://register.consiliui.europa.cu/pdf/cn/12/st17/st17813.cn12.pdf);
and the rnost recent text with the proposed revisions was published in June 2013 and is
available athttp://register.consilium.curopa.cu/pdf/cn/13/st09/st09636.cn13.pdf
The SSM and EBA Amending Rcgulations arc expected to be published in
October 2013.
2. Some may wonder whether a "third way" is possible, since the progress towards
the Centre has been slow and, as of lately, there have been more centrifugal than
centripetal forces, with the exception of the banking union proposals.
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Mechanism "SSM" regulation and the European Banking
Authority "EBA" amending regulation, are then analyzed in Part
IIL Part IV addresses the uneasy relationship between the
banking union and the obligations of the single market in
financial services. The paper closes with some concluding
observations.
1. BANKJNG UNION: WHAT IS IN A NAME?
The financial crisis that commenced in the United States in
August 2007 and that became a global financial crisis in 2008
following the demise of Lehman Brothers has had a profound
effect in the EU. In the Euro area, the financial crisis mutated
into a sovereign debt crisis in May 2010, spearheading a frenzy
of legislative and policy reforms. At the root of the Euro area
problems lies a fundamental inconsistency between a relatively
strong monetary pillar (with the euro and the European Central
Bank "ECB" at the center) and weak economic and supervisory
pillars (where economic policies are, under a light EU
coordination, still a national competence). This paper deals with
proposed reforms to address the weakness in the supervisory
pillar.
The name 'banking union' is a bit of a conceptual
accordion, with different layers. Arguably, the first layer of a
banking union has already been achieved via European
regulation, namely the Directives and Regulations that form the
corpus of common rules under which banks operate in the
EU/European Economic Area "EEA". Of course, this first layer,
this 'narrow' banking union, was incomplete-as evidenced by
the financial crisis-due to the lack of effective rules on cross-
border crisis management and insolvency. The 'banking union'
that the European Commission advocated in September 2012
goes beyond regulation, and encompasses micro supervision
and crisis management - including deposit insurance, resolution
and insolvency. A 'broader' and full banking union should
encompass all these elements plus lender of last resort and
macro prudential supervision. (Some macro-prudential powers
have actually been conferred to the ECB according to the
December 2012 and July 2013 of the proposed SSM regulation).
3. See SSM Regulation and EBA Amending Regulation, supranote 1.
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As discussed elsewhere4 while regulation refers to the
establishment of rules, micro supervision in a narrow sense (i.e.,
supervision stricto sensu) refers to the oversight of financial firms'
behaviour, in particular risk monitoring and risk control. Micro
supervision in a broad sense can be understood as a process with
four stages or phases: first, licensing, authorisation or chartering
(entry into the business), secondly, supervision stricto sensu (the
essential component of any supervisory process), thirdly,
sanctioning or imposition of penalties in the case of non-
compliance with the law, fraud, bad management or other types
of wrongdoing, and, finally, crisis management, which comprises
lender of last resort, deposit insurance and resolution and
insolvency.
The problem with banking crises is that they often require
the involvement of the fiscal authority. Hence, a full banking
union needs some degree of fiscal union. Each of the weak
pillars of Economic and Monetary Union ("EMU")-the
economic one and the supervisory one-are not only weak on
their own; they are also weak in their inter-linkages. Though the
focus of this paper is on the banking union proposals, and not
on the economic governance challenges that lie under the
creation of a fiscal union,5 the latter issue cannot be ignored, in
particular when considering the issue of burden sharing of the
potential fiscal costs of bank recapitalization.
II. THE ROUTE TOW4RDS THE BANKIVG LAION\
The idea of a single European supervisory authority is not
new, neither doctrinally nor from a policy perspective.
4. For a further elaboration of these four stages with regard to banking
supervision, see ROSA M. LASTRA, CENTRAL BANKING AND BANKING REGULATION 108-
144 (1996). The difference between micro supeivision and macro supervision is
explained inter alia in paragraphs 26 and 27 of the House of Lords Report (European
Union Committee, Sub-Committee A) on "The Future of EU Financial Regulation and
Supervision" of 17 June 2009, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
1d200809/1dsclcct/ldcucom/106/106i.pdf.
5. For a recent study of the economic governance challenges and proposals to
address the weakness in the cconomic pillar, see generally Rosa M. Lastra &Jean-Victor
Louis, European Economic and M4onetar Union: History, Trends and Prospects, Y.B. EUR. L.,
(2013) (analyzing the law of the European Economic and Monetary Union), available
at http://yel.oxfordjournals.org/conte/carly/2013/03/27/yl.yeL)t003.full.pd.
6. SSM Regulation, supra note 1, at 10 ("The European Parliament called on
various occasions for a European body to be directly responsible for certain supervisory
2013] 1193
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However, concrete steps towards its realization are very recent,
since the political consensus for the creation of such authority
was only agreed in 2012.
Ahead of the European Council meeting in June 2012, the
president of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso,
called in his speech for a creation of banking union, as "a
natural priority" given that financial integration is "one area
where major progress could quickly be made, even without
Treaty changes."7 This vision was supported by the report of the
president of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy,
acknowledging that EMU "is facing a fundamental challenge"
and that it "needs to be strengthened to ensure economic and
social welfare."8 According to the report the achievement of
closer EMU integration and its prosperity is based on the four
building blocks: an integrated financial framework, an
integrated budgetary framework, an integrated economic policy
framework, and democratic legitimacy and accountabilityY
tasks over financial institutions, starting with its resolutions of 13 April 2000 on the
Commission communication on implementing the framework for financial markets:
Action Plan, and of 21 November 2002 on prudential supervision rules in the European
Union."). Jean Victor Louis noted in his comments that he advocates "centralisation of
powers at the level of the ECB (or another European authority) in order to avoid
regulatory capture, the tendency of national supervisors to refrain from
communicating on problems concerning national institutions and, in general, to place
national interests first,".
7. Jos6 Manuel Durfo Barroso, President of the European Commission, Joint
European Parliament Debate on the Forthcoming European Council Meeting and the
Multiannual Financial Framework (June 13, 2012) (Lranscript available at
http: /curopa.ui/rapid/press-rielcaseSPEECH- 12-440_cn.htmi); European
Commission, Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, the
European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Comnittee, the
Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank. Action for Stability,
Growth and jobs, COM (2012) 299 Final, at 4-5 (May 2012), available at
http://cc.turopa.eu/curopc2020/pdf/nd/cccoim20l2_cn.pdf (voicing the idea of a
banking union).
8. HERMAN VAN ROMPUY, EUROPEAN COUNCIL, TOWVARDS A GFNUINF ECONOMIC
AND MONETARY LINTON 4 (May 2012), available at http://wNy.consilium.europa.eu/
ucdocs/cmnsData/docs/pressdata/cn/cc/134069.pdf; see President of the European
Council, Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union: Interim Report, (Oct
2012) (describing the "economic and monetary union resulting from sharing a
currency), available at http://www.consiliui.curopa.cu/uedocs/cms-data/docs/
pressdata/en/ec/ 132809.pdf.
9. VAN RONPUY, supra note 8, at 16 (describing democratic legitimacy and
accountability as a "guiding principle [that] is key to ensuring the effectiveness of the
integrated financial, budgetary and economic policy frameworks").
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The report suggests that these building blocks should be
put in place over the next decade. However, the time frame for
achieving an integrated financial framework is much tighter, as
supra-national supervision is considered to be a necessary
condition for the possible direct recapitalisation of euro area
bankso via the European Stability Mechanism.'
Based on a single rulebook1 2 integrated financial
supervision or banking union comprises single deposit
insurance 3 and single resolution framework'4 in addition to
10. European Council, Euro Area Summit Statement (June 2012) ("an ellective
single supcivisory mechanism is . . . [necessary in order to] have the possibility to
recapitalize banks directly."), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cm sdata/docs/pressdata/cn/cc/1313)59.pdf.
11. Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, T/ESM 2012/cn, para.
6, available athttp:/,/mT.esm.europa.eu/pdf/esimtreaty en.pdf.
12. Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council
of 26.June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms
and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. The concept of 'single rulebook'
encompasses both Regulations and the Technical Standards of EBA, but not Directives.
A key element in this rulcbook is the proposed regulation on capital requirements. Id.
art. 315.
13. A single deposit guarantee scheme ("DGS"), sometimes referred to as deposit
insurance scheme, for the banking union would ensure a lecl playing-ficid for the
protection of depositors in the Member States that participate in the banking union.
14. The framework includes a recent draft directive and a single resolution
regulation proposal. For the latest text of the draft directive - which is also a
component of the single market and, thus, a piece of legislation that needs to be
transposed into national law in all EU Member States - see European Commission,
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment iirms
and amending Council Directives 77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC Directives 2001/24/EC
2002/47/EC 2004/25/EC 2005/56/EC 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/
en/13,/stll/sti1l48-re01.enl3.pdf. The single resolution regulation proposal was
published in July 2013 and is available at
http://euri-lex.europa.eui/LexUriServ7/IexUriSeryv.douri=()M:2013:0520:FIN:
EN:PDF. Given that this article was completed well before this proposal was published,
an in-depth analysis of this very important proposed single resolution regulation - a key
piece of the banking union proposals given the link between supervision and crisis
management - is not provided in this article.
As stated earlier in this article, there was a lack of effective rules on cross border
crisis management and insolvency that was quite evident during the financial crisis.
There were several memoranda of understanding signed by the central banks,
supervisory authoritics and finance ministries, including an MoU on cross-border
cooperation in crisis situations but the provisions, even those mandating supervisory
cooperation and information sharing, were not abided by during the crisis. See for
example, Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation between the Financial
Supervisory Authorities, Central Banks and Finance Ministries of the European Union
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single European banking supervision (Single Supervisory
Mechanism or SSM).1 The latter element is of a great
significance for the supervisory architecture in the EU as it goes
far beyond the recommendations of De Larosikre report'6 and
the subsequent establishment of the European Supervisory
Authorities ("ESAs") 17 and foresees the transfer of micro-
prudential supervisory tasks of euro area banks (and of other
non Euro area banks in Member States that choose to be part of
the SSM area) to the ECB.
On September 12, 2012 the Commission published the
proposal for a Council Regulation conferring specific tasks on
on Cross-Border Financial Stability, I June 2008, Brussels, available at:
http:/www.cch.curopa.eu/pub/pdf/othier/iou-financialstability2008cn.pdf;
Memorandum of Understanding on co-operation between the Banking Supervisors,
Central Banks and Finance Ministries of the European Union in Financial Crisis
situations, 18 May 2005, available at: http://www.ccb.curopa.cu/press/pr/date/2005/
html/pr050518_ 1en.html; Memorandum of Understanding on high-level principles of
co-operation between the banking supcivisors and central banks of the European
Union in crisis management situations. 10 March 2003. available at
http://www.ech.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2003/html/pr00310_o3.en.html.
15. See generall, EU ROPEAN COMMISSION, MENMORANDUNI ON THF BANKING UNION,
MEMO/12/413. (June 2012). available at http://curopa.cui/rapid/press-
releaseMEMO-12-413_en.htm; see also, VAN ROMPUY, supra note 8, at 4 (June 2012)
("Integrated supervision is essential to ensure the effective application of prudential
rules, risk control and crisis prevention throughout the EU. The current architecture
should evolve as soon as possible towards a single European banking supervision system
with a European and a national level. The European lecl would have ultinate
responsibility. Such a system would ensure that the supervision of banks in all EU
Member States is equally effective in reducing the probability of bank failures and
preventing the need for intervention by joint deposit guarantees or resolution funds.
To this end, the European level would be given supervisory authority and pre-emptive
intervention powers applicable to all banks. Its direct involvement would vary
depending on the size and nature of banks. The possibilities foreseen under Artice
127(6) TFEU regarding the conferral upon the European Central Bank of powers of
supervision over banks in the euro area would be lully explored.").
16. DE LAROSIRE GRP., THE HIGH-1 FvF, GROUP ON FINANCIAL SUPERVISTON IN
THL EU (February 2009), available at http://cc.curopa.cu/intcrnal markct/finances/
docs/de larosiere-report-en.pdf. The Group supported an extended role for the
European Central Bank ("ECB") in nacro-prudential supervision. However, it did not
support any rol for the ECB for inicro-prudential supervision for a number of reasons.
Id. para. 171.
17. Council Regulation No. 1093/2010 Establishing a European Supervisory
Authority (European Banking Authority), 2010 O.J. L 331/12: Council Regulation No.
1094/2010 Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and
Occupational Pension Authority), 2010 OJ. L 331/21; Council Regulation No.
1095/2010 Establishing the European Securitics and Markets Authority (ESMA), 2010
0.J. L 331/84.
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the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the
prudential supervision of credit institutions (SSM Regulation);1S
the proposal for a regulation amending the regulation
establishing European Banking Authority (EBA Amending
Regulation) and a Communication.2o The establishment of a
Single Supervisory Mechanism is seen by the Commission as a
crucial and important first step towards completion of the
banking union.21
The proposed SSM Regulation sets out: (1) the supervisory
responsibilities of the ECB for credit institutions within the
banking union; (2) the role of the national competent
authorities in the banking union; (3) the supervisory,
investigatory and enforcement powers of the ECB and (4) the
organisational changes to the ECB relating to the SSM,
concerning its independence, its governance and accountability
mechanisms.
The major change the proposed SSM brings about is the
advent of powerful European supervision for credit institutions
in the Euro area and in those Member States that choose to
become part of the banking union.
The legislative basis for the SSM Regulation is Article
127(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
("TFEU"), which allows the Council to confer "specific tasks
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of
credit institutions and other financial institutions with the
exception of insurance undertakings" and requires for its
18. European Corninission, Proposal for a Council Regulation conferring specific
tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential
supervision of credit institutions, COM (2012) 511 Final, (Sept. 2012) [hereinafter
Septenber 2012 Commission Proposal] available at http://cur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriSery.do-uri=(ELEX:52012PC051 1:EN:NOT. Supra
note 1.
19. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of thc European Parliament
and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a European
Supeivisory Authority (European Banking Authority), COM (2012) 512 Final (Sept.
2012), available at http://cur-lex.europa.cu/LexUriSciv/
LexUriSer. douri=CLEX:52012PC0512: EN: NOT; see alsosupranote 1.
20. European Commission. Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council: A Roadnap towards a Banking Union, COM
(2012) 510 Final, (Sept. 2012), [hereinafter A Roadmap towards a Banking Union]
available at http://cur-lex.curopa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriSciv.do?uri=
CELEX:52012DC0510:EN:NOT.
21. Id.at7.
2013] 1197
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adoption unanimity by the Council, after consulting with the
Parliament and the ECB.2 2
However, the decision to base the SSM Regulation on
Article 127(6) has been criticised by some. For example,
Marianne Thyssen, the Parliament's rapporteur on the SSM
Regulation, commented that:
[T]he Barnier proposal is problematic for the Parliament
. . Commissioner Barnier has based his proposal on Article
127 (6) of the Treaty. For the European Parliament, this
means we can only give advice instead of deciding together
with the Council. If we are serious about the need for more
democratic accountability, Parliament needs to have co-
decision powers for this proposal.
On November 28, 2012 the ECB adopted an opinion on the
SSM regulation and the EBA regulation,24 welcoming the
proposals. The ECB recognizes (point 1.1 of the Opinion) that
"The architecture of economic and monetary union needs to be
substantially strengthened to break the adverse link between
banks and sovereigns." Unsurprisingly, the ECB considers (point
1.2) that Article 127(6) provides an appropriate legal basis for
the transfer of supervisory tasks to the ECB.
The ECB advocated the establishment of a single resolution
mechanism as a 'necessary complement to the SSM' (point 1.3).
As outlined in the ECB opinion, the main principles that
should underpin the SSM are: independence, separation
between monetary policy and supervision, recourse to national
authorities (a natural extension of the principle of subsidiarity)
22. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 127(6), 2008 O.J. C 83/47, at 57 [hereinafter TFEU].
23. Marianne Thyssen, European Banking Superv ision to Break Vicious Cycle Between
Banking Crisis and Government Debts, EPP GROUP IN THF EUROPEAN PARTIAMENT (Dec. 9,
2012), available at htp://www.cppgroup.cu/press/showpr.asp?prcolntroldoctypeid=
l&prcontrolid=113 86&prcontentid=18979&prcontentlg=en. The Swedes (and some
others) expressed doubts on thc kgal basis as the competencies conferred are not
specific tasks. See Alex Barker, Doubts Grow on Banking Union, FIN. TIMLS. Nov. 14, 2012.
24. S generally, European Central Bank, Opinion on a proposal for a Council
regulation conferring specific tasks on the ECB concerning policies relating to thc
prudential supervision of credit institutions and a proposal for a regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), 2012
OJ. C 30/6, available at http://www.ccb.int/ccb/lcgal/pdf/
c_03020130201enOO060011 pdf.
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and accountability. The latter (i.e., accountability) is different
from the issue of supervisory liability (addressed in point 1.7),
which the ECB considers should be strictly limited to cases of
'intentional misconduct' or 'gross negligence.' The ECB
opinion also addresses the need for adequate macro-prudential
tools, an area in which the ECB will share responsibility with
national authorities (no mention is made in the opinion of the
European Systemic Risk Board). The opinion also emphasizes
the need to 'ensure that the new framework will be consistent
with the single market' (point 1.10), an issue which is further
discussed in Part IV below.
The proposed EBA Amending Regulation reflects the
enhanced role of the ECB under the SSM Regulation and
amends the voting procedures at the EBA to take into account
the division between banking union and non-banking union
member states, and the need to accommodate the needs of the
latter. The EBA Amending Regulation is based on Article 114
TFEU, which requires a qualified majority for adoption by the
Council and agreement with the Parliament.
On November 29, 2012 the Parliament adopted the report
on the SSM Regulation25 and the report on the EBA Amending
Regulation.26 These reports contain draft Parliament legislative
resolutions on the relevant legislative proposal and the text of
which sets out amendments to the Commission's proposals.
On December 13, 2012 the Council reached agreement on
the legislative proposals at a meeting of the Economic and
Financial Affairs Council ("ECOFIN"). The revised versions of
the proposed SSM Regulation27 and the EBA Amending
25. See European Parliament, Report on the Proposal for a Council Regulation
Conferring Specific Tasks on the European Central Bank Concerning Policies Relating
to the Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions, COM (2012) 0511 (Dec. 2012)
[hereinafter Parliament Report on SSM Regulation], available at
http:,//vw.europari.europa.eu/sides/getl)oc.do-tpe=REPORT&reference=A7-2012-
0392&languagcEN#titil.
26. See European Parliament, Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council Amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010,
COM (2012) 0512, available at http://www.curoparl.curopa.cu/sides/
getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP% 2f% 2fNON SGML% 2bREPORT% 2bA7-2012-
0393%2b0%2b)O(C%2bP)F%2bV0%2102ilN.
27. Proposal for a Council Regulation Conferring Specific Tasks on the European
Central Bank Concerning Policies Relating to the Prudential Supervision of Credit
Institutions-Consolidated text of December 14, 2012 [Proposed SSM Regulation],
2013] 1199
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Regulation 8 were subsequently published by the Council. The
typical negotiations between the two co-legislators commenced
in January 2013; the European Parliament and the Council
reached agreement in March 2013. The most recent text of the
proposed EBA Amending Regulation (to be adopted according
to the ordinary EU legislative procedure) was published in June
2013, and the final proposal for the SSM Regulation (to be
adopted by the Council in accordance with a special legislative
procedure) was published in July 2013.2
av ailable at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/ei/12/stl7/stl7812.enl2.pdf.
Supra notes 1 and 18.
28. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
Amending Regulation (EC) No 1093/2010 Establishing a European Supervisory
Authority (European Banking Authority), revised proposal of December 14. 2012 [EBA
Amending Regulation], ,alable at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/
st17/st17813.en12.pdf. Supra notes 1 and 19.
29. See supra note 1. It is perhaps worth recalling the EU ordinary legislative
procedure that is applied in the cae of the EBA Amending Regulation. The -co-
decision" procedure was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty on European Union
(1992), and extended and made more effective by the Amterdam Treaty (1999).
Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), 1992 0.J. C 191/1; Treaty of Amsterdam
Amending the Treaty on European Union. the Treaties Establishing the European
Communities and Certain Related Acts, 1997 0J. C 340/1. With the Lisbon Treaty
taking effect on December 1, 2009, the renamed 'ordinary legislative procedure'
became the main lkgislative procedure of the EU's decision-making system. Treaty of
Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, 2007 O.J. C 306/1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon]. It is based on
the principle of parity and means that neither institution (European Parliament or
Council) may adopt lkgislation without the other's assent. As defined in Article 294 of
the TFEU, the flow of the procedure is as follows: The Commission sends its proposal
to Parliament and the Council. They consider it, and discuss it on two successive
occasions. After two readings, if they cannot agree, the proposal is brought before a
Conciliation Committee made up of an equal number of representatives of the Council
and Parliament. Representatives of the Commission also attend the meetings of the
Conciliation Committee and contribute to the discussions ("Trilogue"). When the
Committee has reached agreement, the text agreed upon is sent to Parliament and the
Council for a third reading, so that they can finally adopt it as a legislative text. The
final agreement of the two institutions is essential if the text is to be adopted as a law.
Even if a joint text is agreed by the Conciliation Committee, Parliament can still reject
the proposed law by a majority of the votes cast. TFEU, supra note 22, art. 294.
Jean-Victor Louis noted in his comments: "As a matter of fact, the EP prefers to
proceed informally by negotiating on a first informal position than to vote in a first
reading formal amendments which stratify the respective positions. In the case of the
two regulations (the SSM one which is by the way not a case of application of the
ordinary procedure but is formally one of special legislative procedure, but which the
EP has treated globally with the EBA regulation where the ordinary procedure is
applicablc), there is not yet up to now a first reading by the EP. WhaL will be voted by
the EP in September will be (hopelully) the approval of the two texts in iirst reading.
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The Commission originally intended the SSM Regulation
and the EBA Amending Regulation to come into force on
January 1, 2013. In December 2012, the Council of the EU
agreed that the ECB should assume its SSM supervisory role on
March 1, 2014 or twelve months after the entry into force of the
legislation, whichever is later, subject to operational
arrangements.so However, despite earlier assurances, the
reference to the date when the ECB shall assume its supervisory
tasks was removed from the July text of the proposal. "1 Political
expediency and the need to break the vicious link between
sovereigns and their banks explain the relatively ambitious
timetable for the implementation of these reforms (even though
the September text of the Regulations established a tighter
schedule than the December text): "When such mechanism
[SSM] will be in place for banks in the euro area the ESM could
. . . have the possibility to recapitalize banks directly."3
As stated elsewhere: "Though the final details of the
legislation need to be ironed out through the regular EU
decision making process, it is important to emphasize that the
authority of the ECB in its function as supervisor should be fully
respected in order to enjoy the benefits of the proposed SSM." 3
This allows to the EP and the Council to negotiate in a more flexible way that what they
have done within the first quarter of this year with the assistance of the Commission.
This procedure has the merit of effectiveness [it is faster] but is not as transparent and
formal as the procedure provided by the Treaty. This 'simplified' procedure was
applied, for example, for the six-pack as well as for the two-pack."Supra note 1.
30. See Proposed SSM Regulation (December 2012 text), supra notes I and 27, art.
27(2).
31. See Proposed SSM Regulation (July 2013 text),supra note 1, arts. 33 and 34.
32. September 2012 Commission proposal, supra note 18, at 2 (describing the
June 29, 2012 Euro Area Sunit). As Barroso stated on September 12, 2012: "We want
to break the vicious link between sovereigns and their banks." Commission Proposes New
ECB Powersf Banking Sup eision as Part ofA Banking Union, EUROPEAN COMMISSION
(Dec. 9, 2012), http: /cc.curopa.ut/cyprus/news/20120912_ccbpowersi cn.hti. The
banking union plan is a political precondition for the ESM to be able to directly
recapitalize Euro area banks. In its ruling of September 12, 2012, the German
Constitutional Court said that Germany could ratify the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM), provided it includes sufficiently binding conditionality agreements.
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BN erw(E] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 12, 2012, 2
ENTs l-iJIU NGEN DES 'N Bu R u I [BVLRwGE] 13901. available at
http://www.bverfg.dc/cn/decisions/rs20120912 2bvli139012cn.htUnl.
33. Lastra & jean-Victor Louis, supra note 5, at 148.
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III. THE SSM REGULATION AND THE EBA AMENDING
REGULATIO-N
In this Part we discuss the specific contents of the two
proposed regulations.
A. The SSM Regulation
The proposed SSM Regulation." confers upon the ECB
specific tasks concerning polices related to the prudential
supervision of credit institutions in the euro area and in other
EU Member States that become part of the 'banking union'
('participating Member States'). The ECB will also act as the
host supervisor for credit institutions established in non-
participating Member States that provide banking services in
participating Member States through branches or on cross-
border services basis.3 5 A memorandum of understanding will be
concluded between the ECB and the national competent
authorities of non-participating Member States, which will clarify
inter alia the cooperation in "emergency situations."
The supervisory tasks will be carried out by the ECB within
the SSM - which is a mechanism, not an institution - composed
of the ECB and national competent authorities. 6 In its role as
supervisor under the SSM, the ECB's objective is to promote the
safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the
financial system, with due regard for the unity and integrity of
the internal market." In this regard, the ECB will have the task
to ensure compliance with Union rules.38
The original proposals (of September 2012) envisaged that
the ECB would be exclusively responsible for the prudential
34. See Council Regulation Conferring Specific Tasks on the European Central
Bank Concerning Policies Relating to the Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions -
July 1, 2013 [SSM Regulation], available at http://register.consilium.curopa.eu/pdf/
en/13/stO9/st09044.enl3.pdf. Supra note 1.
35. Id. art. 6(4).
36. Id. art. 6(1).
37. Id. art. 1.
38. Id., Recital 23. As one reader of a draft of this paper pointed out to me, the
ECB has indeed this task in the Treaty but only concerning NCBs (art. 271(d) TFEU);
how then can the ECB do this towards the National Competent Authorities (NCAs)
that are not NCBs? Normally this should be the norminal procedure Commission against
Member SLatCS. The recitals do not have the power to change the share of
competencies established in the Treaty.
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supervision of all euro area credit institutions. However, the
December 2012 text of the proposed SSM regulation (the result
of further political compromise), specifies that certain
'significant' credit institutions will be directly supervised by the
ECB, while the rest will be supervised by national authorities,
though the ECB retains the right to supervise them if needed
(typically at the request of the European Stability Mechanism, in
an emergency). Both the December 2012 text of the proposed
SSM Regulation as well as the final proposal ofJuly 2013 to some
extent adopt the 'Champions League' model I have advocated
before and to which I refer in Part IV below. As Recital 17 of the
July text of the SSM regulation states: "[T] he ECB should have
full regard to the diversity of credit institutions and their size
and business models, as well as the systemic benefits of diversity
in the banking industry of the Union."
The criteria to determine this 'significance' relate to size,
important for the economy of the EU or any participating
Member State or significance of cross-border activities. This is a
delicate and ongoing process and the final details can still be
changed.
According to Article 6(4) of the SSM regulation, for the
purposes of ECB direct supervision, a credit institution-or
financial holding company or mixed financial holding
company- will be deemed to be 'significant' if any of the
following conditions are met:"
[T] he total value of its assets exceeds EUR 30 billion; or
the ratio of its total assets over the GDP of the participating
member state of establishment exceeds 20%, unless the total
value of its assets is below EUR 5 billion: or
the ECB confirms that a credit institution is significant with
regard to the domestic economy, following a notification by
its national competent authority.
It is one of the three most significant credit institutions in a
participating Member State.
The ECB may also, on its own initiative, consider that a
credit institution is significant when such institution has
established banking subsidiaries in more than one participating
39. See SSM Regulation, supra note 34, art. 6(4).
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Member State and its cross-border assets or liabilities represent a
significant part of its total assets or liabilities subject to
conditions laid down in the methodology to be drawn up by the
ECB.
Finally, any institution that directly receives or requests
public financial assistance from the European Financial Stability
Facility ("EFSF") or the European Stability Mechanism ("ESM")
is also 'significant.'
The proposed SSM Regulation allows the competent
supervisory authorities in non-euro area Member States to enter
into 'close supervisory co-operation' arrangements with the
ECB, subject to the conditions specified in Aiticle 7. If such an
arrangement is established (by a decision adopted by the ECB),
the ECB will carry out the same supervisory tasks for the credit
institutions of that Member State as those it will undertake for
euro area credit institutions. 40 The supervisory architecture in
non-euro area Member States will not be directly affected by the
SSM Regulation. However, it is anticipated that the ECB will sign
memoranda of understanding with the national competent
authorities of non-participating Member States describing in
general terms how they will co-operate with one another in the
performance of their supervisory tasks.41
The ECB will have exclusive responsibility for those
prudential supervisory tasks-conferred upon it by the SSM
Regulation in accordance with Article 127(6)-which are
indispensable for the detection of risks to the viability of credit
institutions and which require the ECB to take the necessary
action.42 The ECB will ensure compliance with EU banking
legislation (including national law transposing Union
legislation). Of particular relevance-in the light of widespread
undercapitalization of European banks-is the Capital
Requirements Directive (CRD) 43 recast and replaced by the
40. Id. art. 7.
41. Id. art. 3(6).
42. Id., art. 4(1).
43. See generally Directive 2006/48/E( of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 14 june 2006 Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of
Credit Institutions (recast), 2006 O.J. L 177/1: Directive 2006/49/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on the Capital Adequacy of Investment
Firms and Credit Institutions (recast), 2006 O.J. L 177/201.
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CRD VI package: the CRD IV Directive and the Capital
Requirements Regulation (CRR) .44
Under the proposed SSM Regulation the supervisory
responsibilities of the ECB in relation to credit institutions will
depend on whether the credit institution is a significant credit
institution or not.4 5
For all credit institutions established in the participating
Member States and thus subject to the proposed SSM
Regulation, the ECB: (1) will authorise and withdraw
authorization 46 (the ECB will only authorise a credit institution
if the national competent authority of the Member State in
which the credit institution is to be established has confirmed
that relevant authorization requirements imposed by the
national legislation have been met);47  (2) will assess the
'acquisition and disposal qualifying holdings' with the exception
of bank resolution cases, (subject to the procedure set in Article
15 which requires compliance with relevant national
legislation) ;48 and (3) may set higher prudential requirements,
counter-cyclical buffer rates and other macro prudential tools
(acting in cooperation with national authorities) .4
44. See generally Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and the
Council of 26 june 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the
prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive
2002/87/E( and repealing Directives 2006/48/E( and 2006/49/EC 2013 0.J. L
176/338; Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and
investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, 2013 O.J. L 176/1.
45. As one reader of a draft of this paper pointed out to me, one can distinguish
between macro-prudential tasks and tools (SSMR, art. 5) where there is a concurrent
ECB/N(As competence and common procedures (authorization, withdrawal of
authorization, qualifying holdings) where the ECH has exclusive competence. For
FICOD-related tasks (financial congloncrates-Ar t. 4(1) (h)), art. 6(6) SSMR does not
refer to art. 4(1) (h) for NCAs decisions related to less significant banks. Therefore.
there is a question currently discussed whether the ECB tasks apply to signiicant and
less significant banks or only significant banks. See Directive 2011/89/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 Amending Directives
98/78/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2006/48/EC and 2009/138/EC as Regards the
Supplementary Supervision of Financial Entities in a Financial Congloncratc, 2011 O.J.
L 326/113 [hereinafter Financial C onglomerates Directive ("FICOD")].
46. SSM Regulation, supra notes I and 34, arts. 4(1) (a), 14.
47. Id. art. 14(1)-(3).
48. Id. arts. 4(c), 15.
49. Id. arts. 5(2), (5).
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The supervisory responsibilities listed below will be the
exclusive competence of the ECB and will be exercised directly
by the ECB with regard to significant credit institutions and by
the national competent authorities with regard to less significant
credit institutions, in accordance with Article 6(6) of the SSM
regulation:
[C]ompliance with prudential requirements related to
capital, liquidity, leverage, securitisation, large exposure
limits, reporting and public disclosure of information on
those matters;5o
governance arrangements, including the fit and proper
requirements for the persons responsible for the
management of credit institutions, risk management
processes, internal control mechanisms, remuneration
policies and practices and effective internal capital adequacy
assessment processes, including internal ratings based
models;5'
assessment of applications made by credit institutions
established in a participating Member State seeking to
establish a branch or provide cross-border services in a non-
participating Member State;5
imposition of requirements on credit institutions to have in
place robust supenisory reviews, including stress testing;5
supervision on a consolidated basis over credit institutions'
parents established in one of the participating Member
States, including over financial holding companies and
mixed financial holding companies, and participating in
supervision on a consolidated basis;54
participation in supplementary supervision of a financial
conglomerate in relation to the credit institutions included
in it and assumption of the tasks of a co-ordinator where the
ECB is appointed as the coordinator for a financial
conglomerate; 55 and supervisory tasks in relation to
recovery plans, and early intervention (where a credit
institution does not meet prudential requirements and, only
50. Id. art. 4(1) (d).
5l. Id. art. 4 (1) (c).
52. Id. art. 4(1) (b).
5a?. Id. art. 4 (1) (f).
54. Id. art. 4(1) (g).
55. Id. art. 4(1) (h).
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in the cases explicitly stipulated in the Union law, structural
changes required from credit institutions to prevent
financial stress or failure). Any resolution powers are
excluded.56
Recourse to national authorities is a practical necessity,
since supervision is a resource and personnel intensive task.
Resolution is not considered part of the remit of the ECB, i.e., it
will not be an ECB task, since it has been interpreted that it does
not fall under the scope of competences that can be conferred
upon it by Aiticle 127 (6) of the Treaty.
Though 'micro-supervision' is transferred from the national
authorities to the ECB according to the requirements outlined
above, 'regulation' (rule-making under EU law) does not
change.
Although in ordinary circumstances, the ECB will not have
direct supervisory responsibility for less significant credit
institutions (other than for authorisations and change of control
purposes), it will issue regulations, guidelines or general
instructions to national competent authorities for the
performance of the supervisory responsibilities that the ECB
itself undertakes in respect of significant credit institutions. 7
To perform its supervisory tasks the ECB will be given the
supervisory powers currently held by the national competent
authorities under existing banking legislation.58 The ECB will
also be given investigatory and enforcement powers, including
powers to request all relevant information from credit
institutions;59 conducting onsite inspections;(o imposition of
pecuniary penalties and periodic penalty payments.61
The ECB shall carry out its tasks independently from other
EU institutions in its role as banking supervisor@6 and it will be
accountable for the performance of these tasks to the European
Parliament and the Council.6 The ECB's existing monetary
56. Id. art. 4(1) (i).
57. Id. art. 4. See also, R. Smits, Legal trapsfacing the ECB. CENTRAL BANIVGG, Vol
23(2) 2012, pp. 53-58.
58. Id. arts. 9(1), 16.
59. Id. art. 10.
60. Id. arts. 11-12.
61. Id. art. 18.
62. Id. art. 19.
63. Id. art. 20.
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policy tasks will also be separated from its supervisory tasks to
reduce the risk of conflicts of interest.>
The separation between monetary policy and supervision is
a most contentious issue. The primacy of the goal price stability
according to the Treaty (Article 127(1) TFEU) of course does
not permit the placing of financial stability at the same level as
monetary stability. The ECB, as I have argued elsewhere, is a
creature of its time, as other central banks are. Thus, while the
Federal Reserve System has several unranked statutory goals
(price stability, financial stability, growth and employment), the
ECB has a primary goal, which is price stability. No doubt this
will be a lively issue in the life of the banking union.
Furthermore, supervision is a 'micro' task, very legally oriented
and thus the 'macro' culture of the ECB needs to undertake a
fundamental cultural adjustment, whereas lawyers have to play a
very substantive role. In this particular aspect, the ECB needs to
learn from the 'culture' of the US Federal Reserve System.
In terms of governance, the requirements of the Treaty and
the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB act as major constraint
to achieve both parity of treatment between Euro area and non
Euro area Member States as well as adequate compliance with
the governance structure of the ECB in terms of the discharge of
its fundamental monetary policy mandate. The ECB Governing
Council is only open to Euro area Member States Central Bank
Governors. In order to solve these quandaries, an internal body,
a so-called 'Supervisory Board', composed of the authorities of
the SSM participating Member States, will be established within
the ECB to prepare and execute decisions on supervisory
matters. This Supervisory Board (which is not anchored in
primary law but in secondary law) will be the centre of gravity of
the SSM and will consist of:
a Chair and a Vice-Chair who will be approved by the
Parliament, on the basis of a proposal made by the ECB;
four representatives of the ECB; and
one representative of each national central bank or other
national competent authority. 6
64. Id. art. 25.
65. Id. art. 26.
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Supervision can also be a very litigious task (the
reputational damage is always a risk for the competent
supervisory authorities, and a risk that the ECB should
particularly fear in the light of its monetary policy
responsibilities) and, given the fact that the Court ofJustice of
the European Union has exclusive jurisdiction to review the
legality of ECB acts,66 the SSM regulation foresees in Article 24
the establishment of an independent 'Administrative Board of
Review'. This board, composed of five members and two
alternates appointed for a five year tenure, renewable once
('individuals of a high repute, from participating Member States
and with a proven record of relevant knowledge and
professional experience, including supervisory experience') will
carry out a swift and discreet internal review of the procedural
and substantive legality of the supervisory decisions taken by the
ECB in accordance with the SSM regulation. Any natural or
legal person can request a review.
66. The ECB can only be sued before the ECJ and not before a national court.
Art. 263 TFEU reads as follows: "The Court of Justice of the European Union shall
review the legality of lkgislative acts, of acts of the Council, of the Commission and of
the European Central Bank. other than reconmendations and opinions, and of acts of
the European Parliament and of the European Council intended to produce legal
effects vis-a -vis third parties. It shall also review the lkgality of acts of bodies, offices or
agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-2-vis third parties.
It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State,
the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of
competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the
Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers.
The Court shall have jurisdiction under the same conditions in actions brought by
the Court of Auditors, by the European Central Bank and by the Committee of the
Regions for the purpose of protecting their prerogatives.
Any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first and
second paragraphs, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or
which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is
of direct concern to them and does not entail impilmenting measures.
Acts setting up bodies. offices and agencies of the Union may lay down specific
conditions and arrangements concerning actions brought by natural or legal persons
against acts of these bodies, offices or agencies intended to produce lkgal effects in
relation to them.
The proceedings provided for in this Article shall be instituted within two months
of the publication of the measure, or of its notification to the plaintiff. or, in the
absence thereof, of the day on which it cane to the knowledge of the latter. as the case
may be." TFEU, supra note 22.
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Supervision is not cheap. The resources the ECB will need
will be substantial. The ECB's supervisory tasks will be financed
by fees imposed on the credit institutions that it supervises.67
B. EBA Amending Regulation
The SSM will coexist with the European Supervisory
Authorities (ESAs) and the European Systemic Risk Board. Of
the three ESAs, of course, it is the European Banking Authority
that will most "suffer" from the establishment of a powerful
European supervisory authority: the ECB.
EBA will retain its existimg powers and tasks within the
banking union and will receive further powers when it comes to
resolution. However, the establishment of a true powerful
European supervisor obviously requires that some amendments
be made to the EBA Regulation to reflect the enhanced role of
the SSM. The revision of the EBA Regulation is related to the
voting modalities and the composition of EBA management
board. The new status of the ECB as a competent authority for
the purposes of the EBA regulation is reflected in Article 1(1)
EBA Amending Regulation.68
The EBA Amending Regulation also seeks to ensure that
there are at least two members of the EBA management board
who are representatives from the Member States not
participating in the banking union.69
The EBA Regulation currently provides for decisions
concerning regulatory matters (i.e. technical standards,
guidelines and recommendations) to be taken by the EBA board
of supervisors on the basis of a qualified majority of its members.
Other decisions are taken by a simple majority of the voting
members. The EBA Amending Regulation will adjust voting
mechanisms to reflect the role of the ECB in coordinating the
position of the Member States participating in the banking
union and to safeguard the interests of non-participating
Member States. " EBA Amending Regulation proposes to confer
67. Proposed SSM Regulation, supra note 34, art. 30.
68. Proposed EBA Amending Regulation, supra note 1.
69. Id., art. 1(8).
70. As one reader of a draft of this paper pointed out to ne, in reality the ECB
takes up this responsibility for most credit institutions and only the supervisory
competence for the small credit institution (could be) left at national level. Therefore,
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decision-making powers on an independent panel and establish
a "reverse voting mechanism" intended to ensure that any
proposal prepared by the independent panel is supported by the
Member States both participating and non-participating in the
banking union.71 Article 1(7) of the EBA amending Regulation,
which replaces Article 44(1) of the existing EBA regulation,
reads as follows:
[T]he Board of Supervisors shall take decisions on the basis
of a qualified majority of its members (...) which shall include at
least a simple majority from members of participating Member
States [in the SSM] (...) and simple majority from members of
non participating [in the SSM] Member States.
Though non participating Member States can block
decisions that do not command a simple majority this rule may
be revisited if fewer than five member states are outside the
SSM.7
IV. THE BANKLIG UNION AND THE SINGLE MARKET
The issues of 'jurisdictional domain' haunt the current
banking union proposals, since two of the four cornerstones of
such proposals relate to the EU as a whole (namely a framework
for recovery and resolution 3 and a single rule-book), while the
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and a Single Resolution
it is correct to say "coordinating" rather than "cxpressing," as there will still be some
national supervisory responsibilities and task s (and therefore positions to coordinate).
However, in the order of importance, the weight of the individual national positions
will in reality be very small.
71. EBA Amending Regulation, supra note 1, art. 1(7).
72. As one reader of a draft of this paper pointed out to me, it appears that we
might already be there, since five non-Euro area Member States will probably ask to be
covered, in addition to all the Euro area Member States.
73. While the jurisdictional domain of the franework for the Draft Directive on
recovery and resolution is the whoic EU, singlc resolution is an clement of the banking
union. 'He wvho pays the piper-and I wvould add in this context he wvho benefits from
the payment-calls the tune'. The jurisdictional domain of the single authority for
resolution should be the SSM areaThe single resolution regulation proposal was
published in July 2013 at
http://cur-lex.curopa.cu/LexUriSciv/LexUriSer.Idouri=(OM:2013:0520:FIN:EN:
PDF.
The Recovery and Resolution Directive (RRD) is expected to be published in January
2014. The latest proposal of the RRD is available at
ht[p://register.consiliui.curopa.cu/pdf/cii/13/s11 /st11 148-rc0lcnl3.pdf. Supra
note 14.
2013] 1211
1212 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:1190
Authority relate more specifically to the needs of the Euro area.
Furthermore, state aid rules are a fundamental component of
the Single Market, and are intrinsically related to the area of
resolution. The needs of a well functioning single market in
financial services cannot be disentangled from the design of the
supervisory pillar.74
According to Recital 11 of the SSM Regulation: "A banking
union should therefore be set up in the Union, underpinned by
a comprehensive and detailed single rulebook for financial
services for the internal market as a whole and composed of a
single supervisory mechanism and new frameworks for deposit
insurance and resolution. In view of the close links and
interactions between Member States whose currency is the euro,
the banking union should apply at least to all euro area Member
States. With a view to maintaining and deepening the internal
market, and to the extent that this is institutionally possible, the
banking union should also be open to the participation of other
Member States. "7
In the case of the UK, the challenge is that while the
strengthening of those two pillars responds to the needs of the
Euro area (Chancellor Osborne referred to the 'inexorable
logic' of fiscal union), the efficient functioning of the single
market in financial services is essential for the City of London as
a leading financial centre.
The existence of two 'banking authorities:' EBA and ECB is
a reflection of the co-existence of the Single Market and the
Banking Union. These two realities have different jurisdictional
domains though some of their needs intersect. From an
institutional perspective, EBA is not as powerful-has never
been, will never be-as the ECB. EBA is a product of the gradual
74. A very interesting issue is the discussion on the ECB "location policy," i.e. the
wish for CCPs clearing sizeable amounts of euro-denominated financial instruments to
be located in the curo area and subject to EurosystLem oversight-thC UK has just this
week brought the third case T-93/13 against the ECB on this issue (the others being T-
496/11 and T-45/12), arguing that this policy discriminates CCPs located in the UlK
and breaks down the singic market. These discussions make apparent the difficult
balance between the need for further and enhanced integration in the curo area and
the need to preserve the single market. United Kingdom v. ECB, [T-93/13] (not yet
reported); United Kingdom v. ECB, 2012 OJ. C 98/40; United Kingdom v. ECB, 2011
OJ. C 340/58.
75. See SSM Regulation, supra note 34.
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federalisation of financial law7 6 in the EU. The ECB, on the
other hand, is a proper European institution. The ECB is
governed by primary law, while EBA is a product of secondary
law. The Euro area, the SSM area, the EU and the EEA
represent concentric circles of integration, subject to
differentiation and conditionality. The single market, the great
achievement of the EU as a whole, is what the UK most wishes to
preserve. But the agenda of further integration is moving ahead
with or without the UK.
The Communication of 12 September 2012 addressed the
conundrum of the uneasy co-existence between a banking union
and the single market. It stated:
The single market for financial services is based upon
common rules which ensure that banks and other financial
institutions . . . are subject to equivalent rules and proper
supervision across the EU. The creation of the banking union
must not compromise the unity and integrity of the single
market which remains one of the greatest achievements of
European integration . . . . The single market and the banking
union are thus mutually reinforcing processes.77
Issues of jurisdictional domain have characterized the
design of financial regulation and supervision in the United
States, with a mix of federal and state powers. Federal law
prevails in securities, while insurance has traditionally been a
matter of state law and banking offers a mix of federal and state
powers. Over the years, however, there has been a process of
federalisation in the supervision and crisis management of
financial institutions, with the latest addition, the Dodd Frank
Act, substantially increasing federal powers for any financial
institution that is deemed to be systemically significant. Lender
of last resort was federalised in 1913 with the Federal Reserve
Act, while the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
was established in 1933. FDIC has three hats as receiver of failed
or failing banks (and now also financial institutions under the
Orderly Liquidation Authority), deposit insurer and supervisor.
76. See T'akis Tridimas, ELU-inancial Regulation: From Harmonisation to the Birth of
EUFede-aFinanciaLaw, 05 EUI WORKING PAPERS: IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISTS ON
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMC CONSTITUTION 3, 14 (Harold James, Hans-W. Micklitz, &
Heike Schweitzer eds., 2010).
77. A Roadmap towards a Banking Union, supra note 20.
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My preference for a "Champions League" model of
supervision (only systemically relevant pan European credit
institutions would have been supervised by the ECB, while the
other smaller credit institutions would have continued to be
supervised by national authorities, following guidelines dictated
by the ECB) has to some extent been followed in the December
2012 and July 2013 texts of the proposed SSM Regulation
(though not in the September 2012 text). The problems of the
Spanish 'cajas de ahorro', as before the experience with
Northern Rock, had made the European authorities wary of
anything less than supervision of all credit institutions in the
Euro area. But the adequacy of ECB supervisory resources in this
humungous task is one of the factors that dictated the proposed
adoption in December 2012 (andJuly 2013) of a two tier system,
whereby certain 'significant' credit institutions will be subject to
direct supervision by the ECB, while others will largely remain
under the supervision of national competent authorities in
participating member states.78
The two-tier system also addresses possible concerns by
national Parliaments, while leaving the ECB the possibility of
claiming direct supervision of any 'less significant' institution
that it believes can cause systemic risk. (This system resembles to
some extent the one adopted by the Dodd Frank Act 2010 in the
USA, which gives authority to the Financial Stability Oversight
Council to place any institution that it designates as systemically
important under the supervision of the Federal Reserve System).
The principle of proportionality is maintained, while keeping
the key goal of the SSM.so
The road to a full banking union must also acknowledge
that supervision and crisis management are part of a seamless
process. An adequate framework for crisis management is
78. See Proposed SSM Regulation, supra note 1, art. 5 and note 29, art. 6.
79. National Parliaments in Germany, Austria and Denmark must vote in favor of
the approval of the SSM Regulation (since any transfer of comrpetences to the Union
requires previous parliamentary approval in accordance with their constitutional
norns). See Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 29, Protocol on the Role of National
Parliaments in the European Union (stating that all national Parliaments will receive
the proposed regulation); Proposed SSM Regulation, supra note 27, preamble (noting
that the draft legislative act has been sent to the national Parliaments).
80. See Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 29, [it. 1, art. 3: see also SSM Regulation, supra
notes I and 34, recital 87.
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fundamental for the success of the proposed banking union.
The ECB has powers for early intervention and withdrawal of
licenses under the SSM proposals. The route to follow from
early intervention to resolution and insolvency needs to be
crystal clear in a banking union. The decision made in 2012 to
take steps towards the formation of a European banking union
raises major questions about the instruments needed to address
the problems posed by mismanaged or troubled banks while
preserving financial stability. The creation of the Single
Supervisory Mechanism and the broader banking union must
coexist with the existing architecture for competition and state
aid. When it comes to resolution, this is particularly relevant,
given the European Commission's (Directorate-General for
Competition) control of state aid in bank restructuring. The
European Commission remains in charge of watching over the
compliance of State aid with EU rules.,"'
The September text of the proposed SSM regulation
addressed micro supervision in a broad sense (including
licensing and revocation of licenses) and early intervention, but
does not mention lender of last resort nor macro supervision.
Neither the December, nor the July text of the proposed SSM
regulation mention lender of last resort, though the proposals
confer some macro prudential powers-according to Articles 4a
and 5 respectively of the SSM Regulation-upon the ECB.
Responsibility for macro-prudential supervision is thus to be
shared between the ESRB, the ECB and national authorities,
while responsibility for lender of last resort in the Euro area is
currently divided between the ECB (when it comes to 'market'
liquidity assistance) and the national central banks (when it
comes to collateralized lines of credit to individual illiquid but
solvent banks, according to the ECB's own restrictive
interpretation of article 14.4 of the ESCB Statute).82
81. See European Commission, Communication from the Commission on the
application, fron 1 August 2013, of State aid rules to support ncasurcs in favour of
banks in the context of the financial crisis ('Banking Communication'), 2013/C
216/01. (July, 2013) available at http://cur-lex.europa.cu/LexUriServ/
LexUriScry.do?uri= J:(:2013:216:0001:0015:EN:PDF.
82. One wonders if this situation could change now, once the ECB will be in
charge of prudential supervision of credit institutions. In these new circumstances,
nothing should preveint the ECB to give ELA to the institutions it supcvises-in the
sense of temporary help to illiquid but solvent institutions at a higher interest than they
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Though "prudential supervision" is a broad and
discretionary concept, it has some contours. The principle of
subsidiarity comes to mind when reading the SSM regulation.
The problems of coordination amongst different
authorities-in the case of the EU, the ESRB, EBA and ECB-
are real, as the tripartite arrangement in the UK showed during
the Northern Rock episode. The issues of jurisdictional domain
further haunt the banking union project, since the European
Banking Authority (EBA) will remain in charge of the single
rule book (i.e. regulations and technical standards) and will be
guardian, with the Commission, of the single market. But the
ECB will be a very powerful institution. EBA's existence and
powers (strengthened by the EBA regulation) are justified
because of the different jurisdictional domain EU/Euro area,
but add a layer of complexity to the supervisory picture. That
complexity is further compounded by the need to coordinate
with ESMA and EIOPA. And complexity frustrates
accountability.
Recital 31 of the SSM Regulation emphasizes the need for
cooperation not only with EBA, but also with ESMA and EIOPA,
as well as with the relevant resolution authorities and facilities
(reference to ESFS and ESM) financing direct or indirect public
financial assistance. 8 But this is likely to be terribly complicated.
As stated earlier, the move from early intervention or pre-crisis
management to full crisis management must be crystal clear.84
Resolution, lest we forget, is a highly legal, highly technical,
highly complicated task- very micro and resource-intensive. It
requires legal certainty and clear powers. It is even more
would pay otherwise, for collateral-that could be different from the one that is
required for monetary policy operations. The "own restrictive interpretation" of the
beginning of the monetary union, according to which ELA is a national, non-
Eurosysteln, task appears to have been mainly based on the link between the central
bank granting ELA and the supervisor, whose task is to assess, and confirm, that the
credit institution in trouble is illiquid but solvent (therefore taking some responsibility
for the ensuing risk for the central bank), supervisor that remained at that point in
time a national supervisory authority. In future, for the credit institutions for which the
supervisory responsibility is moved to the ECB, it would make full sense that the
decision whether or not to giant ELA is taken by the ECB.
83. SSM regulation, Supra note 34, recital 31.
84. See EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE. EUROPEAN BANING UNION: KEY ISSUES
AND CHALLENGES 146 (2012), available at www.publications.parliaiel.uk/pa/
Id201213/ldselect/Ideucom/88/88.pdf.
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thankless than supervision. In my opinion, for example, the
Bank of England should not have availed itself to host the SRR
unit (not to mention the potential conflict with its LOLR role).
As for cross-border resolution, as Charles Randell says, 'it is all
about funding and burden sharing'.85
Financial stability is a key goal for national, European and
international authorities. To achieve this goal the authorities
have a variety of instruments at their disposal: regulation,
supervision (micro and macro), lender of last resort, recovery
and resolution tools, orderly insolvency and others. The
challenges the ECB will face as a monetary and supervisory
authority are similar to those faced by the Bank of England in its
dual mandate to safeguard both monetary and financial stability.
The transfer of prudential supervision away from the central
bank in 1997 deprived the Bank of England of a major
instrument-i.e., supervision-to deal with financial stability
(leaving it 'only' with a lender of last resort role). A return of
supervision to the Bank of England after the financial crisis
characterises the new financial legislation in the UK (the logic
being 'if I am going to assist you on a rainy day, I need to know
what is going on in a sunny day'). The advent of macro
prudential supervision has further reinforced the link between
monetary stability and financial stability.
There are a number of other underlying challenges in the
reform plan. To begin, legitimacy (to avoid a growing
disconnection between the intellectual elite and the general
population), then the underlying problem of stagnant growth
(are pro-cyclical measures and fiscal austerity the right
medicine?) and finally the recognition that supervision is a
thankless task, that can have negative reputational effects in the
discharge of the central bank's main responsibility: the conduct
of monetary policy.
When it comes to austerity, rivers of ink have been written
in recent months. Europe needs fiscal consolidation (not simply
deficit cutting that can jeopardise the social fabric of a nation),
economic reform and banking reform.
85. See genera1l Charles Randell. European Banking Union and Bank Resolution, 7 L.
& FIN. MARKETS RFV. 30 (2013).
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The issue of sufficiency of ESM resources is, of course, a
major concern (as it has always been for the International
Monetary Fund, which cannot print its own money). The
European Central Bank, on the other hand, does have the
capacity to print money. Indeed, the very announcement of the
ECB's bond purchasing program: 'Outright Monetary
Transactions'16 was sufficient to halt the crisis, at least for the
time being.87
As regards the accountability mechanisms of an
independent institution such as the ECB, when it comes to
prudential supervision, they need to be properly designed not
only vis-A-vis European institutions but also vis-a-vis national
authorities.88 Supervisory independence is not the same as
86. Press Release, European Central Bank, Technical features of Outright
Monctary Transactions (Sept. 6. 2012), available at http:/www.ccb.int/press/pr/date/
2012/html/pr 120906 1.en html.
87. Though some commentators. notably Gene Frieda, noted that rather than
being in an 'acute phase of the crisis. we may have cntcred a 'chronitc phase of the
crisis. See Gene Frieda, Zombie Banks Aust not Derail Recovely, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2013,
http://wm,.ft.coi/intl/cm0s/s/03657fc10-769c- 11c2-ac9
001 44fcabdcO.hil#axzz2PJYfbKPu.
88. On March 16, 2013, one reader of a draft of this paper made the following
observation in private correspondence: "The issue of independence of the ECB from
political interference on the one hand and accountability of the ECB on the other is
highlighted by the decisions that have been imposed on Cyprus this weekend by the
Eurogroup politicians, wvith the apparent support of the FCll." See generally Press
Release, Eurogroup, Eurogroup Statement on Cyprus (Mar. 16, 2013), available at
http://mwT.consilium.europa.euedocs/cms data/docs/pressdata/en/
ecofin/136190.pdf); Press Release, International Monetary Fund, IMF Statement on
Cyprus at the Eurogroup Meeting (Mar. 16, 2013), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/np/sec/pr/2013/prl38 0.htm). The initial proposed imposition of a bank
levy on deposit holders in order to partiall "internalize" the cost of recapitalizing the
island's banks sparked much anger in Cypr us, as well as concerns about the safety of
bank deposits in the euro area. See ge erally Cyprus in Crisis over Tax on Bank Deposits,
FIN. TaIES, Mar. 18, 2013, at 1, 6; Eurogroup defends Cyprus bail-out, TELEGRAPH
(London), Mar. 17, 2013, http://www.tlegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcriis/
9935644/Eurogroup-defends-(Cyprus-bail-out.html; Parties Furious over Eurogroup
decision, CYPRUS MAIL, Mar. 16, 2013, http://mTw.cyprus-mail.com/cyprus/parties-
fuirious-over-curogroup-decision/20130316. The subsequent agreement-with a sixty
percent 'haircut' for uninsured deposits, the restructuring of Cyprus biggest
commercial lknder, and the imposition of capital controls - in return for a ! 10 billion
'bail-out' by the IMF and the EU also triggered much controversy. See generally ESM
Board of Governors Grants Stability Support to Cyprus, EUROPEAN STABILIFY
MECHANISM (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.esm.curopa.cu/pdf/ESM%
20Press%/> 20Rclcasc%20ESM%20Board% 20of20(overinors%/o2Ogrants%20stbility%20s
upport%20to%20Cyprusl.pdf.
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monetary independence. 9 And as long as national governments
continue to provide a fiscal backstop (in the absence of a fiscal
union and considering that ESM resources are finite), we should
remember the adage: "he who pays the piper calls the tune".
Article 130 TFEU protects the independence of the ECB in
very strong terms: "When exercising the powers and carrying out
the tasks conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of
the ECB and the ESCB, neither the ECB, nor a national central
bank nor any member of their decision making bodies, shall
seek or take instruction from Union institutions, bodies, offices
or agencies from any government of a Member State or from
any other body". 9o While this degree of independence has
served the ECB well in the discharge of its monetary policy
responsibilities (with relatively limited mechanisms of
accountability, including testimonies before the European
Parliament, publications, financial controls, interviews and press
conferences), when it comes to supervision, the situation should
different and, in the absence of a fiscal union, 'supervisorv
independence' should be construed in less strict terms than the
independence of the ECB in the conduct of monetary policy?11
89. See Fabian Armtenbrink & Rosa M. Lastra, Securg Democratic Accountability of
Financial Regulatory Agencies -A Theoretical Framnework, in MITIGATING RISK IN THE
CONTEXT OF SA}LTY AND SECURITy: How RELVANT IS A RATIONAL APPROACH? 119
(R. de Mulder ed., 2008); see also Marc Quintyn & Michael W. Taylor, 49(2)
Regulatoiy and Supervismy Independence and Financial Stability (International Monetary
Fund Working Paper No. 02/46), available at www.iif.org/cxternal/pubs/ft/wp/
2007/wp 0 725.pdf. Supervisory autonomy requires a measure of distance from
politicians, as well as from the supervised. (It is a double independence - from the
sector and from politics). The accountability mechanisms introduced by the SSM
regulation, especially in Article 20 (8) and (9) on European Parliament / ECB
arrangements for scrutiny of supervisory rolk and confidentiality of supervisoly data are
innovative and wecome. See Rcnc Snits, Recent past events, June 2013 at
http://renesmits.eu/Assessrment%20o0020the%20SSM%20%20a%20(relative) %20outsi
dcrs% 20view.pdf
90. See TFEU, supra note 22, art. 130.
91. The new supervisory tasks may lead to a rethink of the notion of
independence under EU law. When the Maastricht Treaty was negotiated and
subsequently signed, "monetary independence" (in the tradition of the Bundesbank)
was the main concern, since the ECB did not at that time receive direct supervisory
responsibilities (though the door was kft open through the so-called "enabling clause":
Artice 127 (6) TFEU). The European Court of Justice clarified the extent of the
independence of the ECB in the OLAF (European Anti-Fraud office) case. See
European Commission v. European Central Bank. Case C-11/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-7147
134-35 (upholding a "functional" and limited definition of independence: "Artidce 108
[EC] -which is now Article 130 TFEU-seeks, in essence, to shield the ECB from all
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Independence and accountability are two sides of a
continuum.92 Article 19 of the SSM regulation and Recital 75 of
its Preamble proclaim the independence of the ECB in the
exercise of supervision. In terms of accountability, the
December and July texts of the SSM regulation are the
improvements over the September text (with the addition in
December of a provision, Article l7aa, on National Parliaments
in addition to Article 17 which deals with accountability and
reporting). Concerns about accountability should continuously
be voiced.Y
Adequate rules on deposit insurance and resolution are a
fundamental part of a properly functioning Single Market in
Banking Services. However, the banking union proposals go
further and plan to establish a common system for deposit
protection and a more centralised management of banking
crises. A single Deposit Guarantee Scheme94 and a Single
Resolution Mechanism are a logical extension of the granting of
supervisory powers to the ECB." The rationale for a common
political pressure in order to enable it effectively to pursue the objectives attributed to
its tasks, through the independent exercise of the specific powers conferred on it for
that purpose by the EC Treaty and the ESCB statute. ( [The] recognition that the
ECB has such independence does not have the consequence of separating it entirely
from the European Community and exempting it from every rule of Community law.").
92. As one reader of a draft of this paper mentioned in private correspondence:
"The tension between the "single rulebook" and national supervisory discretion is
another issue that touches on accountability. This potentially poses a considerable
problem for the United Kingdom. The size of the UK financial sector could justify
additional measures (ring-fencing, additional loss-absorbing capital) to secure the
safety and soundness of banks, but the maximum harmonization approach of a single
rulebook set by the EBA could make it impossible for the UK authorities to impose
such measures. One size is unlikely to fit all in Europe for some time to coie, given its
very divergent national economies (even within the euro area)."
93. Rosa M. Lastra, Accountability and Governance--Baking Union Proposals,
(Duisenberg School of Finance. Policy Paper No.30, 2012) available at
http://www.dsf.inl/home/research/pubilications.
94. See European Commission. Proposal for a Directive. EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council on Deposit Guarantec Schemes [recast], Brussels
COM(2010) XXX available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/bank/docs/
guarantec /20100712_proposal-en.pdf. The latest Presidency compromise text is
availabic at http://register.consiliumi.curopa.cu/pdf/cn/12/st06/t06382.cn1 2.pdf.
95. See NiCOiAS VERON, PETERSON INSTITITE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS,
EUROPES SINGLE SLPLRV7ISORY MECHANISM AND THE LONG JOURNEY TOWARDS BANMNG
UNION 1 (Dec. 2012) ("When an effective single supervisory mechanism is established .
. . the ESM [European Stability Mechanism] could, following a regular decision, have
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deposit insurance scheme is clear: with perfect capital mobility,
in order to prevent a flight of deposits from troubled countries
to countries perceived to be 'safe', one needs to convince
ordinary citizens that a euro in a bank account in one Euro area
Member State is the worth the same and is as secure as a euro in
a bank account in another Euro area Member State. This is a
real challenge, as the recent experience in Cyprus evidences.'"
However, the conclusions of the European Council have said
nothing about a single deposit guarantee scheme,97 though it
was proposed in the Van Rompuy Report 'Towards a Genuine
EMU."9 8
As for resolution, there are the needs of the internal market
(i.e., adequate rules) on the one hand, and the needs of the
banking union on the other hand (single resolution
mechanism).9
The proposed Directive for bank recovery and resolutionoo
is an essential element for the completion of the single market
in financial services, and, once formally adopted, it will be the
first hard law instrument in the field of cross border resolution
and insolvency and, in principle, a very significant and positive
development. In order to prevent another Lehman we do need
adequate rules for orderly cross border resolution and
insolvency at the EU and international level.
The Directive includes a number of resolution tools.
Resolution needs to be understood in the context of its intimate
relationship with regulation and supervision on the one hand
and emergency liquidity assistance and deposit insurance on the
other hand. And it is one step before insolvency. The timetable
the possibility to recapitalize banks directly."), available at http:/wwwpiiccorn
24.pdf.
96. See Parties Furious over Eurogroup Decision, supra note 88; Torn Hucrtas, Banking
Union: Back to the Drawing Board?, RLUTERS, Sept. 21, 2012, available at
http:/./vow.ey.corn/Publication/vwvlUAssets/11anking-union/$FILE /Banking-
union_21-Sep-12.pdf.
97. Indeed, the German authoritics have been wary about the introduction of
such a European I)eposit Guarantee Scheme. See, e.g., Alex Barker, Brussels shelved bank
deposit scheme, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2012, http://wmy.ft.com/cmS/s/0/c2ddl2cc-fdb-
1lc-9901-00144feabdcO.htlinl#axzz2NQOpKUDjb (describing the cffcts of German
objections).
98. See VAN ROMPUY,supra nIotC 9; see also supra nlotc 14.
99. Supra note 14.
100. Supra note 14.
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for the adoption of the Directive is a problem in itself. Member
States will be required to implement most requirements of the
Directive by January 1st, 2015, whilst the Directive's bail in
requirements must be implemented byJanuary 1st, 2018. These
provisions should be incorporated into national law as soon as
possible.
One of the key tools in the RRD is the bail in instrument. 0
Bail-in is a resolution technique or tool that offers a way for
rapid recapitalization and avoids value destruction by keeping
an institution as a going concern. There are two types of bail in:
bail in via write down (partial wind down) of debt and bail in via
conversion of debt into equity. The proposed Directive focuses
on the latter.102 The essence of bail in is to keep a streamlined
bank (balance sheet restructuring) by allocating losses amongst
bank creditors and shareholders as a going concern.
Bail-in by definition addresses capital rather than liquidity.
Hence, it needs to be complemented with liquidity provision by
the central bank. Indeed, the two key challenges when
discussing the effectiveness of bail in are: liquidity and
credibility (given the stigma likely to be associated with the use
of bail-ins). The 'spirit' of the bail-in technique, as well as the
spirit of prompt corrective action (PCA) in the USA or the now
ever-present concept of living wills (recovery and resolution
plans) is the same: act early, act promptly, act preventively
before losses are potentially inflicted upon taxpayers. (As the old
English adage says: an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of
cure).
The ECB recommended in a recent opinion10 s that
depositor preference (which exists in the USA and Switzerland,
and which has been advocated by both the FSB Key Attributes
101. See generally Rosa M. Lastra, From Bail-out to an Adequate Resolution Franework,
in THE CHALLENGES OF CROSS-BORDLR RESOLUTION: FROM BAIL-OUT TO AN ADLEQUATE
RESOUTION FRAMEWORK 10, 11 (2012) (arguing that the bail in instrument allows
losses to be "allocated amongst bank creditors and shareholders at a point in the life of
the troubled bank that will minimize Costs to taxpayers (or prevent the use of taxpayers'
money at all) and preserve access to critical banking iunctions."), available at
http://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/sitcs/blavatnik/'files/(rossBorderimcmnosMay2012v2.pdf.
See supra note 14.
102. See Proposed Directive for bank recovery and resolution, supra note 14, art.
37(2) (b) ("Member States ... may apply the bail-in tool ... to convert to equity.
103. ECB Opinion of 29 November 2012, point 8.2 (CON/2012/99) available at
http: //w. ecb. it/ ecb/ legal/ pdf/ c03920130212en00010024.pdf.
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for the Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions1o4
and by the Vickers Report in the UK) be included in the RDD.
Banking reforms have become ubiquitous in the aftermath
of the global financial crisis. Though structural issues go beyond
the scope of this paper, let me reflect briefly upon the so-called
Liikanen report,o 5 which addresses the competing demands
between competition and regulation, the existence of highly
protected and oligopolistic banking markets and the issue of the
separation between 'casino banking' and 'utility banking'. The
common denominator behind the Liikanen Report, the Volcker
rule and the Vickers Report is the need to protect depositors
and to prevent the use of depositors' money to finance risky
trading activities and the avoidance of too-big-to-fail policies that
lead to an implicit or explicit government guarantee
(deteriorating the fiscal position of the government and putting
at risk taxpayers' money). They aim at limiting the incentives for
banks to take on excessive risks with insured deposits. o As such
they address structural issues, which the European authorities
should reform. However, the Liikanen report does not
fundamentally alter the universal banking model prevailing in
continental Europe.
CONCLUSION
The euro area crisis has revealed the extent of the too-big-
to-fail problems and its variants (too complex to fail, too
104. See FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, KLY ATTRIBUTES OF EFFECTIVE RLSOLUTION
REGTMES FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 3 (2011), available at
http://wm.filnancialstabilityboard.org/publicatiois/r 11104cc.pdf.
105. In January 2012 European Conmissioner Michel Barnier Set up a high lcyel
expert group to examine possible ways to reform the structure of the EU banking
sector, chaired by Erkii Liikancn. The group's mandate was to establish whether, in
addition to ongoing regulatory reforms, structural reforms of EU banks would enhance
financial stability and improve efficienc and consumer protection. See generally Erkki
Liikancn ct al., Expert Group on Refolrmng the Stiucture of the EU Banking Sector: Final
Report (Oct. 2. 2012), available at http://ec.curopa.cu/interinaliarket/bank/'docs/
high-1evel-expert group/ report en pdf.
106. See PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON BANKING STANDARDS. FIRST REPORT.
H.L. Paper 98. H.C. 848. at 27-29 (Sess. 2012-13), available at
http:././m.publications.pariliament.uk/pa/jt20121 3/jtselect/jtpcbs/98/98.pdf; ROSA
M. LASTRA. XRITTEN EVIDENCE FROM PROFESSOR ROSA M. LASTRA TO THE
PARLLAMLNTARY COMMISSION ON BANKING STANDARDS (2012), available at
http:,//m .publicatiots.parliament.uk/pa/jt20 1213/tselect/jtpcbs/98/98vw20.htm.
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interconnected to fail, too politically sensitive to fail, too big to
save etc) and the associated moral hazard incentives
(privatization of gains, socialisation of losses) that pervade
ubiquitous government assistance. It has also revealed the
pernicious link between bank debt and sovereign debt. The
fundamental need for reform of the banking sector has
triggered a frenzy of legislative, regulatory and policy initiatives.
Though supervisorv failures were mostly in the 'how' to
supervise, many of those initiatives address the 'who' [i.e., who
supervises the financial system]. This is certainly the case at the
European level.
In the EU, the ECB will be the key supervisory authority
once the SSM regulation is approved, while the European
Commission will retain its key legislative functions (level 1
legislation). This risks making EBA to some extent irrelevant,
despite its still important role as guardian of the single rule
book. This paper has addressed the uneasy coexistence between
the banking union and the single market. The former will be
geographically restricted to the countries in the euro area and
to those Member States that choose to participate in the SSM.
The building union project, though still incomplete, is the most
significant development in EU law since the advent of monetary
union in Europe.
The separation between monetary policy and supervision
and the accountability arrangements of the independent ECB
remain however contentious issues. Once the SSM is approved,
the ECB will become a very powerful institution. Debates about
accountability and institutional design should take place ex
ante, not ex post.
